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On Some Philosophical Aspects
of the Background
to Georg Cantor’s theory of sets∗
Christian Tapp
Résumé : Georg Cantor a cherché à assurer les fondements de sa théorie des
ensembles. Cet article présente les différentiations cantoriennes concernant la
notion d’infinité et une perspective historique de l’émergence de sa notion
d’ensemble.
Abstract: Georg Cantor sought secure foundations for his set theory. This
article presents an account of Cantor’s differentiations concerning the notion
of infinity and a tentative historical parsepctive on his notion of set.
∗I am indebted to Joseph W. Dauben for his helpful advise. — Comments to the
author are welcome.
Philosophia Scientiæ, cahier spécial 5, 2005, 157–173.
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1 Introduction
Historical accounts of the life and work of Georg Cantor (1845-1918)
have generally focused chiefly on his mathematical creations, i. e. on
these parts of his scientific production which are — valued by lines of
today’s mathematical judgement — important for the development of
set theory and mathematical logic. However, the founder of set the-
ory also sought secure foundations for his emerging new theory. His
interests in the philosophical (and even theological) background of set
theory were indeed quite broad, and although he tried to defend his new
mathematical theory against attacks he anticipated from philosophers
and theologians, the importance he ascribed to these activities is often
underappreciated.
This paper aims at providing a fresh and new account of two main
aspects of Cantor’s philosophy of mathematics (if it may be referred as
such), namely to the notion of sets (and the question of their reality), and
to the notion of infinity. If it is correct that Cantor’s main mathematical
achievement was the invention of the theory of infinite sets and numbers
— transfinite set theory — then the interrelation between the notion of
set and the notion of infinity is of utmost importance for the investigation
of their (intended) philosophical foundations.
What this paper offers is more a brief and introductory discussion of
Cantor’s philosophy of mathematics, rather than a comprehensive and
all-embracing consideration.
2 Philosophical Apologetics Regarding the
Notion of Infinity
The well-known and for the most part accurate biography by Walter
Purkert and Hans Joachim Ilgauds1 considers Cantor’s philosophy in
the course of a chapter devoted to his personality. Within this chap-
ter, his philosophical efforts come up between some remarks concerning
music, holidays, and strange religious concerns for the older Cantor as
reflected in his edition “Ex Oriente Lux”.2 This gives the impression
that philosophy was an element of Cantor’s private life, or even a side-
occupation for him like playing the violin, having little to do with his
scientific work. In contrast, Joseph W. Dauben’s biography of Cantor3
1[Purkert & Ilgauds 1987].
2[Cantor 1905].
3[Dauben 1979].
Philosophical Aspects of the Background to Cantor’s theory of sets 159
gives more attention to Cantor’s philosophical acitivities and takes them
more seriously.
But Cantor himself appreciated philosophical studies as being of great
importance for the foundations of mathematics in general, and for his
own scientific work in particular.4 As early as in his “Historische No-
tizen über die Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung”5 of 1873, Cantor attached
particular importance to philosophical investigations of mathematics.
With reference to probability theory, for example, he argued that the
demand of mathematics for truth and validity6 calls for a philosophical
critique and a suitable philosophical reason or even “metaphysics” (as —
following Cantor — the French would call it).
Set theory’s inventor was convinced of the need to defend his new
theory of infinite numbers against various objectors and as far as I can
see, this conviction was due not only to Cantor’s scientific views of the
necessity of philosophical scrutiny, but also to a desire to pave the way for
the acceptance of his theory and to lower the opposition to and prejudices
against it. Why were such resistances to await? — At first, the general
view concerning the infinite and its place in science in general and in
mathematics in particular was quite different from ours today. We could
refer for example to the polemical position of Kronecker, for whom only
the natural, but not even the rational numbers could naturally be said
to exist. But such reference to one single position cannot really answer
the aforementioned question.
Instead, the key point is the overall historical situation of mathemat-
ics at that time. Shortly before Cantor’s main ideas began to emerge, the
works of Cauchy, Weierstraß and Dedekind had shown a way out of the
disagreements stemming from careless use of the notion of the infinitely
small. The invention of a precise notion of limit with its — as we would
say today — typical nesting of quantifiers permitted the elimination of a
very problematic notion of infinity, one with which mathematicians had
struggled for a long period of time. And so we see the general situation
at the time Cantor introduced his new theory: Mathematics had only
recently been freed from the problems of one notion of infinity, and now
4Lacking a general term in English for what is called “Wissenschaft” in German,
“science”/“scientific” are used here in a broader sense comprising not only the natural
sciences, but also disciplines like philosophy, mathematics, theology, and so on.
5[Cantor 1873]. — This is an early date (Cantor was about 28 years old) for his
philosophical activities have usually been attributed to a later period of his life.
6More precisely stated, Cantor spoke of the basic concepts and foundations of
mathematics, which take on a certain real validity (“Begriffe und Grundlagen, die
[. . . ] eine gewisse reale Gültigkeit in Anspruch nehmen”) in view of the applicability
of their results. See [Cantor 1932, 365].
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Cantor appears, introducing a new one, and in fact a very much stronger
one, because the new notion could be contrasted with the improper, weak
old forms!
Cantor took up a main distinction from these discussions: he distin-
guished between the proper and the improper infinite. The development
of his terminology concerning this point is schematically presented in the
following table:
18837 “Uneigentlich-Unendliches”
(improper infinite)
“unbegrenzt Wachsendes”
(something growing without
limit)
“synkategorematisches
Unendliches”
(synkategorematical infinite)
“Eigentlich-
Unendliches”
(proper infinite)
“Vollendet-
Unendliches”
(completed infinite)
18868 “potentiales Unendliches”
(potential infinite)
“Indefinitum”
“Aktual-Unendliches”
“aktuales Unendliches”
(actually infinite)
18879 “”
(something boundless)
“”
(sth. definite / marked
off)
Both notions (the improper and the proper infinite) have in common
that they indicate a magnitude that exceeds every finite magnitude, but
the meaning of “exceeds” differs. In modern terms, in the case of the
potential infinite, a process or a functional relation is needed by means of
which the magnitude can be made larger than any given finite value, but,
strictly speaking, the value of the magnitude remains finite. In contrast,
the actually infinite magnitude is larger than every finite magnitude,
independently of any kind of process or function.
Cantor dealt with the improper infinite in two different ways. On the
one hand, he took the underlying problems to be resolved by the works
of Cauchy and Weierstraß. The mathematical notion of limit, which is
crucial for the buildup of analysis, was made precise by the definition
that a is the limit of a sequence an if and only if for every ε there is
a number n0 such that for all n > n0 the (absolute) difference between
a and an is less than ε — a definition of limit in which the notion of
7See [Cantor 1883] = [Cantor 1932, 165-6,175,180] and more often.
8See [Cantor 1886a] = [Cantor 1932, 372-3] and more often.
9See [Cantor 1887] = [Cantor 1932, 401] and more often.
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infinity no longer occurs.10 On the other hand, Cantor was somewhat
attracted by an argument of Constantin Gutberlet to the effect that a
concept of the potential infinite requires an underlying actual infinite
just as (by analogy!) the possibility of moving forward without limit on
a path requires the actual infinity of the path.11
Dealing with the second, the proper or actual infinite was what Can-
tor wanted to defend from criticism. As for Cantor, philosophy was
not excused from the demand of searching for the truth, and thus he
believed that the history of philosophy must be heard and that former
positions must be taken into account. Thus Cantor took the objections
seriously that many philosophers (and also some mathematicians) had
made against the theoretical treatment of the actual infinite. He wanted
no arguments to remain undiscussed, no counter positions to stay undis-
proven so that the extent of his philosophical task of defending philo-
sophically a theory of real infinity ranged from Aristotle through Augus-
tine, Thomas Aquinas, Spinoza, Leibniz, and Kant up to contemporary
schools and positions including neoscolastics and neokantians.
In my opinion, a detailed examination of all these positions and Can-
tors counter-arguments would be of considerable interest, especially from
two perpectives, namely first: Does Cantor’s presentation of the argu-
ments against the actual infinite do justice to their originators’ inten-
tions? And second: Does his rebuttal succeed? Unfortunately, these
questions are beyond the scope of this article.
Instead, I want to propose a very brief overview summarizing the
most important reasons advanced against the actual infinite, and then
offer an equally brief account of Cantor’s counter arguments.
Primarily, there are basically 4 assumptions used to argue against
the real existence of the actual infinite:
(1) There are only finite numbers. (Aristotle)
(2) Something finite would be destroyed if there really were something
infinite. (Aristotle)
10With respect to this point, David Hilbert and the intuitionists shared a com-
mon counter-position. They dealt primarily with the question of whether or not the
quantifiers (∀ε, ∃n0 and ∀n > n0) presume completed totalities or not. Cantor may
not have been opposed to this line of thought, but see his second approach following.
— For Cantor’s first approach, see for example [Cantor 1932, 92-3]. Compare as well
Cantor’s corresponding treatment of the real numbers.
11See for example [Gutberlet 1878, 11-5], and Cantor’s references to Gutberlet
[Cantor 1932, 394].
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(3) The human mind is finite.
(4) The non-finite or the absolute is not capable of determination /
negation (Spinoza and Leibniz, among others).
Let me roughly describe Cantor’s lines of critique.
In Cantor’s view, Aristotle concludes thesis (1) via a petitio principii :
He was only aquainted with counting finite sets and inferred that there
are only finite numbers and therefore only finite sets. But thereby he
equated what he is acquainted with to what there is. This thesis cannot
really support the assertion that there cannot be infinite numbers, and it
fails completely as a result of the existence of transfinite number theory.12
The bare pronouncement (2) cannot claim to be valid, as Cantor
argues with reference to ordinal arithmetic, which demonstrates the fact
that the destruction of something finite by something infinite does not
always occur, but only in the case of adding the infinite ω to 1 from the
right, as opposed to adding it from the left:
ω + 1 = ω = 1 + ω
(or the other way around, depending on the definition of ordinal addi-
tion).13
With considerable insight Cantor detected a vicious circle regarding
arguments that start at the finiteness of the human mind. Most authors
— as he notes — conceived the finiteness of the human mind in terms
of its restriction to a capacity for forming finite numbers. But then this
thesis presupposes what it wants to prove: the impossibility of forming
infinite numbers.14
We have still one argument left and in the case of (4), we have to
make the following distinction: On the one hand, Cantor accepted the
classical theorem “omnis determinatio est negatio” (every determination
is / includes a negation) and agreed to the second part of thesis (4),
namely that the absolute is not capable of any determination or negation,
especially not of a determination by numbers. But on the other hand,
he strongly opposed the first part of this thesis, the rash identification
of the non-finite and absolute.15 This is the systematic germ cell of
Cantor’s later polished distinctions between various notions of infinity
12See especially [Cantor 1932, 174].
13See [Cantor 1932, 174-5].
14See [Cantor 1932, 176-7].
15See [Cantor 1932, 175-6].
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that he eventually worked out in detail. Up to now he had only stressed
the difference between the potential, improper infinite (a boundlessly
growing magnitude) and the actual, proper, real infinite.
But now it became a matter of differences for Cantor within the
real infinite itself — about which he speaks of “modifications”. With-
out such differences, the actual infinite qua negation of the finite could
well be identified with the absolute, highest, indeterminable infinite —
which was not seldom equated to God. This rang a warning bell of the
guardians of faith who suspected Cantor was advocating a pantheistic
metaphysics16 when he asserted later on that the actual infinite existed
not only in the human mind, but also in the created real world. It was
to counter such suspicions that Cantor introduced a further conceptual
distinction between the transfinite and the absolute as two kinds of ac-
tual infinity. He described three ways in which the actual infinite could
occur: as the absolute, the transfinite, and transfinite numbers. He char-
acterised these in the following way:
absolute transfinite transfinite num-
bers
1885 in Deo
extramundano
aeterno
omnipotenti sive
natura naturante
in concreto seu in
natura naturata
transfinite, actual-
infinite ordertypes
1887 in the highest
perfection, in the
absolutely
independent,
extramundane
being, in Deo
realized
represented in the
dependent, created
world
conceived by think-
ing in abstracto as
mathematical mag-
nitude, number or
ordertype
short in Deo in concreto in abstracto
Due to these distinctions the absolute no longer had to be considered
as the only antipode of the finite, and Cantor’s mathematical theory of
actual infinity was freed from the suspicion of pantheism. He was also
able thereby to theoretically define theology as the science which inves-
tigates what can be said about the absolute by human beings. Therefore
Cantor drew the scholastic conceptual distinction between “natura natu-
16Cantor himself once called Hegel a pantheist, see [Cantor 1886a] = [Cantor 1932,
376].
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rans” and “natura naturata”, which goes back at least to Johannes Scotus
Eriugena (died 877). In his main work, “De divisione naturae”, which
was strongly influenced by ideas from Augustine and Boethius, he devel-
oped the first complete medieval system of metaphysics, starting with
a division of all beings according to the act of creation. Therefore, he
discerns the following four kinds of entities:
creans non-creatum God as creator
creans creatum ideas (?)
non-creans creatum spatio-temporal beings
non-creans non-creatum God as destination of beings
This conceptual system developed through the era of medieval scolastics
and was adopted by Giordano Bruno (1548-1600) in the 16th and Baruch
de Spinoza (1632-1677) in the 17th century (in the verbalization “natura
naturans”) and remained popular with 19th-century neoscolastics. It may
well have come to Cantor via Spinoza and the neoscolastics.
Turning back to Cantor’s threefold distinction of the actual infinite,
the relevant difference between Cantor’s viewpoint and that of 17th-
century philosophy depends upon another conceptual distinction. Aside
from the absolute infinite and the finite there is a region of infinity be-
tween them: the region of the transfinite. Transfinite objects — such as
transfinite numbers, for example — really belong to the sphere of the
actual infinite. They do not become infinite, they do not grow without
finite limit, but actually are definite magnitudes of infinity, so that they
belong to the actual, not to the potential infinite.
The transfinite also differs from the absolute, but in what ways? —
Correspondence between Cantor and the Jesuit Cardinal Johannes B.
Franzelin from 1886 shows that both — Cantor and Franzelin — agreed
that the transfinite has to be conceived of as something still enlargable.17
So like the finite it is still enlargable, but the difference with respect to
the finite is that before as well as after any possible enlargement, the
transfinite was and stays actually infinite. On the opposite, the absolute
was taken to be “wesentlich Unvermehrbares”, something that essentially
could not be enlarged, or better: something that was in principle not
capable of enlargement. Making this distinction, Cantor was able to
respect the — so to say — holy and untouchable area of God, although
he was dealing with definite actually infinite entities. He succeeded in
destroying the Cardinal’s suspicions of pantheism-like metaphysics, and
17See Franzelin’s letter to Cantor of the 26.1.1886 [Cantor 1932, 385], referring to
Cantors paper “Zum Problem des actualen Unendlichen” [Cantor 1886b].
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thereby made room for a further and fruitful discussion between Cantor
and Roman-Catholic theologians in the last fifteen years of the 19th
century.
Despite this very brief account of Cantor’s “philosophical coordinate
system”, and in spite of leaving many details out of accout, it seems clear
that for him philosophy was by no means a minor concern or peripheral
occupation.
3 Development of the Concept of “Set”
This section is devoted to the development of Cantor’s notion of set and
to philosophical questions about its meaning.
Arguably, the most famous formulation defining the notion of set is
from Cantor’s last mathematical publication, the two-part “Beiträge zur
Begründung der transfiniten Mengenlehre”18:
Unter einer “Menge” verstehen wir jede Zusammenfassung M von bes-
timmten wohlunterschiedenen Objekten m unsrer Anschauung oder unseres
Denkens (welche die “Elemente” von M genannt werden) zu einem Ganzen.
[By a “set”, I conceive any union M of definite, well discriminated objects
m of our imagination or our thought (which are called the “elements” of
M) into a whole.]19
This definition gives rise to two lines of considerations: first, because it
was widely misunderstood in the context of the subsequent foundational
crisis, and second, because it marks the final stage in the development
of Cantor’s notion of set.
3.1 Cantor’s Definition and the Paradoxes of Set
Theory
The aforementioned definition has often been misunderstood as compris-
ing something like an unrestricted comprehension principle:20 If we take
(but only for the sake of the argument) “Zusammenfassung” (embracing)
to mean “formally definable” (by a formula φ), then for every formula φ
18[Cantor 1895] and [Cantor 1897].
19[Cantor 1895] = [Cantor 1932, 282], transl. from [Dauben 1979, 170]. — For
the sake of simplicity most loci citati are given this way: when citing original papers,
page numbers are given according to the reprinted edition of in Cantor’s collected
works. Translations without attribution are the author’s.
20Concerning Cantor and the paradoxes of set theory, consider [Purkert 1986].
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(of any language whatsoever) there must be a set Mφ consisting of all
objects satifying φ, i. e.: Mφ = {x|φ(x)}. Therefore, it has been said
that this definition leads to the set theoretical paradoxes (Russell and
Burali-Forti, for example).
But this interpretation is surely incorrect. When Cantor required the
“Zusammenfassung zu einem Ganzen” (union into a whole), this was
exactly the caveat he made against “taking-as-a-whole” elements that
cannot be taken to form a whole without contradiction. Some further
evidence is provided by two letters that Cantor wrote to David Hilbert,
one on 26 September, 1897, and the other on 2 October, 1897. In the
second, Cantor emphasized the inconsistency of a “set of all Alephs”,
noting that such a thing might be well-defined but not “ fertig definiert”
(completely defined) because:
Ich sage von einer Menge, daß sie als fertig gedacht werden kann, [. . . ],
wenn es ohne Widerspruch möglich ist [. . . ], alle ihre Elemente als zusam-
menseiend, die Menge selbst daher als ein zusammengesetztes Ding für sich
zu denken. [I say about a set that it can be thought of as complete, [. . . ],
if it is possible without contradiction [. . . ], to think of all of its elements
being together and of the set as a composed thing in its own.]21
And he continues referring explicitly to his “Beiträge”:
Darum definire ich auch im ersten Artikel der Arbeit Beiträge zur Be-
gründung der transfiniten Mengenlehre gleich im Anfang die “Menge” [. . . ]
als eine “Zusammenfassung”. Eine Zusammenfassung ist aber nur möglich,
wenn ein “Zusammensein” möglich [d. h. widerspruchsfrei denkbar, C. T.]
ist. [In the first paragraph of the work Beiträge zur Begründung der trans-
finiten Mengenlehre, just at its beginning I therefore defined the “set” as a
union. But a union is possible only, if a being together is possible.]22
Twelve years earlier, in his “Grundlagen einer allgemeinen Mannig-
faltigkeitslehre” of 1883, Cantor wrote:
Unter einer “Mannigfaltigkeit” oder einer “Menge” verstehe ich nämlich all-
gemein jedes Viele, welches sich als Eines denken läßt, d. h. jeden Inbegriff
bestimmter Elemente, welcher durch ein Gesetz zu einem Ganzen verbun-
den werden kann. [By an “aggregate” or “set” I mean generally any mul-
titude which can be thought of as a whole, i. e., any collection of definite
elements which can be united by a law into a whole.]23
21[Purkert & Ilgauds 1987, 226].
22[Purkert & Ilgauds 1987, 227].
23[Cantor 1883] = [Cantor 1932, 204].
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Leaving aside the observation that “durch ein Gesetz” (by a law) sounds
as if Cantor adhered to the widespread but problematic identification of
sets and definable sets (which in the case of a countable language would
make the number of different sets be countable), we have to conclude at
this point that Cantor’s definition of “set” does not lead to antinomies,
because it simply does not permit an unrestricted comprehension prin-
ciple.
3.2 Cantor’s Definition as a Final Point of Develop-
ment
It is surely correct when Joseph Dauben states that Cantor’s famous
1895 definition served to free him “from the particular character of point
sets and to produce a completely general theory”.24 But we can go even
further and point out that such generality was (to a certain degree)
present right from the beginning, and that the formulation was not only
a liberating but also a restrictive one at the same time.
First we should note that in his early writings, Cantor used the words
“Menge” (set), “Mannichfaltigkeit”/“Mannigfaltigkeit” (manifold), “Inbe-
griff” (collection) and even “System” (system) as basically synonymous.25
Later on (probably after his detection of the contradiction in the notion
of the set of all cardinals), Cantor distinguished two types of “Vielheiten”
(multiplicities): the consistent ones which can be conceived without con-
tradiction as forming a whole, i. e. whose elements can be thought of
as being present altogether at the same time, and the inconsistent ones
which cannot be so conceived. From then on, Cantor reserved the term
“set” for consistent multiplicities only.26
In the 6-part series of articles “Über unendliche lineare Punktmannig-
faltigkeiten” (1879-1884), we find some textual evidence for a remarkably
24[Dauben 1979, 170].
25[Cantor 1874] used the word “Inbegriff” for sets. (As opposed to Zermelo
[Cantor 1932, 118] I would not say that Cantor used the expression “Gesamtheit”
as a synonym for “Inbegriff”. When Cantor said “Die reellen algebraischen Zahlen
bilden in ihrer Gesamtheit einen Inbegriff von Zahlgrößen” [Cantor 1932, 115], then
he used “bilden in ihrer Gesamtheit” — and not “bilden eine Gesamtheit” — to un-
derline the shift of talk from single algebraic numbers to the set of algebraic numbers
and to make clear that his use of “Inbegriff” does not refer to the individual numbers
but to their comprehension into a set.) [Cantor 1878] uses “Inbegriff” and “Mannig-
faltigkeit” synonymously, see esp. [Cantor 1932, 120]. [Cantor 1879] states explicitly
that “Menge” (set) is something like a shorthand for “Mannigfaltigkeit” (manifold),
see [Cantor 1932, 139].
26See his letter of 26 September, 1897, to Hilbert [Purkert & Ilgauds 1987, 224-6]
or his letter of 28 July, 1899, to Dedekind [Cantor 1932, 443-7].
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wide notion of set. In No 3 (1882) Cantor wrote:
Auch der Mächtigkeitbegriff [. . . ] ist so wenig auf die linearen Punktmen-
gen beschränkt, daß er vielmehr als Attribut einer jeglichen wohldefinierten
Mannigfaltigkeit betrachtet werden kann, welche begriﬄiche Beschaffenheit
ihre Elemente auch haben mögen. [Even the notion of cardinality [. . . ] is
not restricted to linear point sets, so that it can be regarded as an attribute
of any well-defined manifold, whatever the conceptual nature of its elements
may be.]27
This quotation is taken from a passage which clearly argues for the
extension from concepts introduced for the investigation of linear point
sets to their use in the context of non-linear point sets, which is still a
genuinely mathematical context. But it is striking that for three para-
graphs no mention is made of this mathematical context. Admittedly,
some incertitude, the passage could cautiously be interpreted as reflect-
ing a conception of set much broader than considered normally. Perhaps
it is a conceptualization meant to include also sets of non-mathematical
objects or even objects of the natural world.
This interpretation of Cantor’s earlier position is also supported by
the quotation from the “Grundlagen” of 1883 given above (p. 166).
There, Cantor considered generally any multitude that may be taken
as a whole. Later, in a note, Cantor emphasized the presumed closeness
of his notions to Plato’s ideas,28 which also contributes to a sense of
generality.
Whether the last point of this interpretation be admitted or not, it
disappears or clearly plays no role in the 1895 definition, where only
objects of our imagination or thought are allowed as elements of sets.
This surely excludes objects of the natural world, and so at the end of
the century, for Cantor the notion of a set and its elements seems to
have been completely restricted to the area of thought and imagination,
meaning that they are purely mental objects.
3.3 The Ontology of Sets
Prominent lines of thought in the philosophy of mathematics investigate
questions like “Is there a real universe of sets?” “Where can it be found?”
“Does the notion of set refer to objects with a certain reality?” “Is set
27[Cantor 1882] = [Cantor 1932, 150].
28See [Cantor 1932, 204].
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theoretic platonism true?” and so on. Strange to say, but these endeav-
ours go along with some kind of (postmodern?) capitulation in the face
of the question of truth. Different frameworks are considered, classified
and analysed, but which framework to choose for oneself is no longer a
question of truth but a matter of taste.
Perhaps, it would be more fruitful to change the point of view to a
different question “How did mathematics and its philosophy arrive at this
problem of seeking a realization or instantiation of its main concepts?”
It seems to me that it was a by-product of axiomatization and a strictly
formal standpoint that resulted in the notion of set losing contact with its
philosophical origins, a rest of which we can find in Cantor’s viewpoints.
So much for something like a philosophical confession which seems to me
necessary in order to explain why I do not consider in detail so many
standard and common sense views on this subjects in what follows.
It seems to me to be of great interest for the philosophy of mathe-
matics to know the ontological status that Cantor assigned to his sets.
In the foregoing subsection we have already seen some evidence for the
hypothesis that Cantor’s early notion of set was a broad one, possibly
embracing sets of physical objects. Therefore, I think it going too far if
one ascribes mind-world dualism and the subordinated location of sets
in the realm of mind-made constructions having something like a “real-
ization” in the real world to Cantor’s philosophical standpoint.
Indeed, Cantor understood the whole numbers and the ordertypes:
als Universalien, die sich auf Mengen beziehen [. . . ] wenn von der Beschaf-
fenheit der Elemente abstrahiert wird. [as universals, which are related to
sets [. . . ] if one abstracts from the nature of its elements.]29
Similarly, cardinal numbers emerge from ordertypes by a further ab-
straction (which Cantor denoted with a second bar over the set symbol).
If ordertypes and numbers are obtained from the real world by an act of
abstraction, then it does not seem suitable to speak of dualism, at least
not in the strict sense of the word which refers to the doctrine claiming
that the world consists of two different substances. What Cantor wanted
to convey is that ordertypes are certain set universals, and the difficulty
with the common classification of Cantor’s views as “platonistic” is that
he in fact did not really resume the discussion of realism of universals,
debated in philosophy since the Middle Ages.
But there are also problems with a broader understanding of “du-
alism”, because Cantor — despite his general criticism and rejection
29[Cantor 1887] = [Cantor 1932, 379].
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of Kantian philosophy — shared the conviction with Kant (and with
Thomas Aquinas, among others), that apriori knowledge also presup-
poses at least some experience. For Cantor it was quite clear that even
mathematical concepts presuppose experience in general, a conviction
— by the way — which Frege misleadingly criticized as Cantor’s “psy-
chologism”.
In section 2 above we have already considered a further distinction
Cantor made in the notion of the transfinite. He discerns on the one
hand the transfinite occuring in nature or, if we want to be more precise
and do not mind running the risk of sounding like a theologian, we should
say: the transfinite occuring in created nature, and on the other hand
the transfinite occuring as order types or numbers respectively. To put
it yet another way: He distinguishes the transfinite in concreto and the
transfinite in abstracto.
This difference is — on first view — far removed from our under-
standing of set theory as an abstract mathematical science just from
its beginning. (A view, which I take to be responsible for persistent
questioning philosophically of the applicability of mathematics in the
natural sciences.30) This is all closely connected with the notion of set
that Cantor held during the second half of the 1880s. At the beginning,
Cantor needed to emphasize certain ontological elements as part of the
background for set theory, which seem to have vanished from his later
publications.
When Cantor defines ordertypes as universals related to sets which
arise from them by abstraction, these elements can be — as Cantor
says — “beliebige wohlunterschiedene Dinge” (arbitrary well-discerned
things). In my opinion, to conceive of these things as elements of a set,
seems not as yet to be a form of abstraction from their concrete nature.
We can find some evidence for this view some pages later in the
“Mitteilungen” where Cantor describes ordertypes as “das intellektuale
Abbild einer uns gegenüberstehenden Menge” (the intellectual image of
a set that exists apart from us).31 It is not implausible to conclude from
this reference to “ intellectual image” that the entity which is imaged
need not itself be an intellectual entity. Moreover, Cantor considers it
as a characteristic of the difference between sets and ordertypes that the
elements of the set must be grasped as “getrennt” (discrete) whereas the
elements of the ordertype are “zu einem Organismus vereinigt” (united
into an organism).
30Recall Cantor’s early statement that probability theory also needed a philosoph-
ical critique with respect to its applicability; see footnote 6.
31See [Cantor 1932, 380].
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Further evidence for this conception of sets as consisting of — so
to speak — natural elements can be found in Cantor’s 1883 address to
the meeting of the “Vereinigung deutscher Naturforscher und Ärzte” in
Freiburg, when he stated that one of the most important problems of
set theory, which he believed to have solved, consists in the challenge of
determining the various magnitudes or powers of sets present in nature
via the notion of an ordinal number.32
I think that we must therefore conclude that Cantor’s original ap-
proach allowed (at least the elements of) sets to be worldly entities, to
be sets of arbitrary natural things such as tables, chairs, pencils, bot-
tles or beer mugs. The first proper act of abstraction enters when the
ordertype and the cardinal number are abstracted from the set under
consideration. To obtain the cardinal number of the set it is necessary
to forget about the specific properties of its elements and their order.
They must be understood — as Cantor says — as units. By abstraction,
each element becomes a “one” so that the set as a whole becomes a set
of ones or of units forming a oneness.
A minimal interpretation simply argues that an eventually given or-
dering of the set’s elements has to be disregarded. But why then speak of
an “organic growth together into each other” to make such an assertion?
I think that Cantor’s emphasis on the organic and uniform character
of cardinal numbers can be understood properly only if we consider his
intention to defend cardinal numbers as real, actual numbers, as falling
under the notion of number, where the “old” notion of number clearly
must be broadened, but keeping its essential features. And therefore
Cantor accepted the classical Euclidean postulate regarding numbers as
real unities, in Greek: 	, in which a multiplicity of units must be
uniformly connected.
Another interesting conclusion can be drawn from Cantor’s review
of Frege’s “Grundlagen der Arithmetik” of 1884. In this review, Cantor
defines the power or cardinality of a given set to be the general notion
under which all sets fall that are equivalent to the given set. (By the
way, we should remark that this concept together with the hypothesis
that elements of sets need not be abstract objects resembles Russell’s
reconstruction of natural numbers as classes of tupels of worldly objects
of the right length, or perhaps, the other way round.)
By now it is apparent that Cantor’s widely-known and famous def-
inition of “set” in his “Beiträge zur Begründung der transfiniten Men-
32Published in the “Mitteilungen” as a part of a letter to Kurd Laßwitz. See also
[Dauben 1979, 291].
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genlehre” of 1895 and 1897 was not something like a constant factor
throughout his development of set theory, but was — at least in its ma-
ture and more exact version — a subject to historical changes, and —
perhaps also — to periods of hiatus.
4 Conclusion
What happened to Cantor’s notion of set during the decade from 1886 to
1895? What discoveries or arguments prompted him to modify his con-
ceptualization and treatment of “sets” in particular? There is some evi-
dence that Frege’s penetrating criticism of what he called Cantor’s psy-
chologismmay have had an influence on this point. But some researchers,
as Dauben, argue for a more cautious assessment of the Cantor-Frege
connection, for as he notes that “there are nevertheless changes in the
Beiträge with which Frege would have agreed.”33 Was it an advance in
thought alone, or conceptual progress that Cantor made in conjunction
with philosophical or even theological influences? — The answers to
these questions are a matter for further research.
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